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INTERNATIONAL LAW: WAIVER OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
M ucH doubt has been cast on the value of a sovereign's waiver of
immunity by the recent holding of Rich v. Naviera Vacuba that a
sovereign may repudiate such a waiver at any time prior to submission
to suit or execution.
The case arose when the captain and crew of the Cuban vessel
Bahia De Nipe, diverting their ship from its destination in the Soviet
Union, brought it within the territorial waters of the United States to
seek political asylum. Libels were filed against the ship and its cargo
in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 2  One of the
claimants, Mayan Lines,3 had previously sued Cuba in a Louisiana
2 197 F. Supp. 710 (EM). Va.) (Hoffman, J.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24. (4 th Cir. 1961).
'Five libels were filed: One on behalf of judgment creditors from personal injury
claims against the company which owned the Bahia De Nipe prior to its nationalization,
one by a creditor of the former owner, one by the United Fruit Sugar Company against
the cargo alone, one on behalf of the defecting crew members for wages, and one by
the Mayan Lines, S.A.
A principal point of contention in the case concerned the fact that the Coast Guard,
acting under executive orders, physically prevented a United States Marshal from
effecting an attachment of the Bahia De Nipe. The district court and the Court of
Appeals held that the Coast Guard had acted without legal authority. Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba, 197 F. Supp. 710, 711-18, 295 F.2d 24, 25 (5961).
*This note deals almost exclusively with the claim of the Mayan Lines since it
was the only libellant possessing a waiver of immunity. Another aspect of the case
significant in another area of the law of sovereign immunity is that concerned with the
libel filed by the United Fruit Sugar Company against the cargo of sugar on board the
Bahia De Nipe. The Company claimed that the sugar had been wrongfully taken
from it in connection with the nationalization of the Company's sugar plantations in
Cuba. The United States Government maintained that while the consfiscation was un-
lawful under international law, this "does not mean that Cuba, as between itself and
petitioner, does not have valid title to the expropriated property so far as our courts
are concerned. .... " Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to the Applica-
tion for a Stay, filed September ii, 1961, with the Supreme Court. Quoted from
Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 6, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, December 28, 196i.
The district court rejected the Company's argument on the ground that "vessels
and cargo expropriated by, and in the possession of, a foreign sovereign are immune
from suit upon a suggestion of immunity." Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 197 F. Supp.
at 724. -But see, Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d
128 (x961). The Court of Appeals referred to but did not specifically discuss the
claims made by the Company. Mr. Chief Justice Warren denied the United Fruit
Company's petition for a stay, citing the cases of Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 252 (1897), and Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918).
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state court on a claim arising out of a commercial transaction. The
attorney for Cuba had assented to a court-approved settlement whereby
the attorney purported to exercise on behalf of Cuba an absolute waiver
of immunity as to execution and enforcement of the judgment.4 In the
instant case, the Mayan Lines sought to enforce the prior judgment.
On application of the Republic of Cuba, the United States Department
of State filed, for reasons of foreign policy, a suggestion of immunity5
with the district court.' The court, treating the original waiver as
valid,7 held that the present assertion of immunity was effective to
The expropriations aspect of the Bahia De Nipe case is discussed in Baade, The
Validity of Foreign Confiscations: An Addendum, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 504. (t96z) ;
Rabinowitz, Immunity of State-Owned Ships and Barratry, J. Bus. L., Jan. 1962,
p. 89i Reply Brief of Appellant, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, pp. 3-9, Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, filed on December 28, 1961.
'The settlement included a submission to the court's jurisdiction, a compromise of
the original S,ooo,ooo claim for $5oo,ooo, and an absolute waiver of immunity.
Portions of the latter read as follows: "Cuba waives any and all rights of sovereign
immunity which it may now or hereafter be entitled to plead. Republic of Cuba ac-
knowledges, admits and declares that the judgment herein provided for shall be a valid,
legal and binding judgment. . . . With respect to the enforcement and execution of
said judgment, Republic of Cuba hereby specially and specifically waives the provisions,
exemptions or immunities which it may be entitled to plead as a bar in the enforcement
and execution of this judgment. . .. 11 See 197 F. Supp. at 719-72o.
'The assertion of immunity was made on behalf of the Republic of Cuba through
the auspices of the Government of Switzerland, which presently handles the diplomatic
relations between the United States and Cuba.
It should be noted that there never was a specific repudiation of the waiver. The
Swiss government merely made a general assertion of immunity as to the Bahia De
Nipe which did not mention the waiver. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 197 F. Supp. 710,
720-21 (1961).
The following circumstances explain the great interest of the U.S. Government
in the Bahia De Nipe case. The entire controversy took place in the context of the
hijacking of planes and boats between the U.S. and Cuba. On July 25, 196z, an
Eastern Airlines plane was hijacked and landed in Cuba. The United States on August
2, 1961, made a solemn declaration before the United Nations that it would return
all hijacked property. On August 16, x961, (the day before the Bahia De Nipe ar-
rived at Norfolk), Cuba returned the hijacked Eastern airliner. President Kennedy,
himself intervened in the Bahia De Nipe case when on September ii he "advised the
Solicitor General that, in the light of the time already expired, it is urgent that this
Cuban vessel be released immediately without further delay." Memorandum for the
United States in Opposition to Application for Stay by libellant Rich, p. 12, Files of
Supreme Court. Quoted in Reply Brief for Appellant, p. 9, Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, Second Circuit Court of Appeals, December 28, 196i.
' There was some question whether the court could entertain a suggestion of im-
munity until the ship was attached, but the court relied on The Carlo Poma, 259 Fed.
369 (2d Cir. i95g), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 255 U.S. 219 (592o), to hold
that it could. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 197 F. Supp. at 718-19 (1961).
'The United States Government argued that the waiver was not valid because
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reinstate Cuba's immunity notwithstanding the waiver's incorporation in
a court-approved settlement. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed per curiam.8
The district court felt precluded by the Swedish State Railway case'
from giving effect to the waiver. That case, however, dealt with a
judgment entered against the Swedish State Railway in a suit in which
the Swedish Government had made no plea of sovereign immunity.
The plea was first entered in the action to collect the judgment. The
court dismissed the action on the ground that a sovereign's submission
to suit was not a waiver of immunity from execution. Thus, the
district court would seem to be mistaken in considering the Swedish
State Railway case authority for the proposition that a waiver, once
made, may be subsequently retracted.
A sounder precedent for the court's decision is the case of Princi-
pality of Monaco v. Mississippi,0 which was cited as establishing a
there had been no official act by the sovereign and because there was no evidence in the
court record of the attorney's authority to execute the waiver. In rejecting this argu-
ment, the court found as a fact that the attorney had full and complete authority to
execute the waiver and held that no official act of the sovereign except the acts of its
attorney are necessary. The court relied upon The Sao Vicente, 295 Fed. 829 ( 3rd
Cir. 1924), in which it was held that a general appearance entered by the attorney
for the Republic of Portugal constituted a valid waiver of immunity from suit even
though Portugal later objected to the attorney's action. In the Bahia De Nipe
case there was no indication whether Cuba considered the waiver to have been validly
executed. Compare United States of Mexico v. Rask, ix8 Cal. App. 21, 4 P.2d 98i
(1931) (a claim of sovereign immunity cannot be made by a private attorney).
The British rule seems to be contra. See Baccus S.R.L. v. Servicio Nacional, [1957]
I Q.B. 4385 Wedderburn, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Public Corporations, 6
IN'rL & CoMp. L.Q. 290 (1957); Note, 73 L.Q. REV. 286 (-957).
8 It is perhaps significant to note the speed at which the events in the Bahia de Nipe
case progressed. The first libel was filed on August 18, 1961, the decision of the dis-
trict court was announced on August 29, 1961, the Court of Appeals handed down
its opinion on September 7, 1961, the Chief Justice denied stays on September 1-14,
i961i , and the Bahia De Nipe sailed from the United States on September t5, 196z.
'The Swedish State Railway case [Dexter & Carpenter v. Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930)] "appears to foreclose the right of Mayan Lines, S.A., to
prevail in its efforts to effectively attach the Bahia De Nipe." 197 F. Supp. at 722.
For discussion of the Swedish Railway case see 25 AM. J. IN'rL L. 335 (193 1) ; Note,
31 COLUM. L. REV. 660 (1931) ; Note, 16 ST. Louis L. REv. 177 (1931) ; Note, 79 U.
PA. L. REV. 644 (93i).
20292 U.S. 313 (1934). The case involved a suit brought upon bonds issued
by the defendant. The Court dismissed the suit on the ground that a state may not be
sued by a foreign government without its consent. In the course of the opinion, the
Court commented: "The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding
on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretention to a compulsive force. They
confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will." 292 U.S. at 325. See
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general doctrine that a sovereign's contract is binding only on its con-
science. The district court considered the waiver in favor of the Mayan
Lines as only a "contractural agreement not to plead immunity"" even
though the waiver was incorporated in a valid judgment. Conse-
quently, the waiver was viewed as binding only on the conscience of the
Republic of Cuba, subject to repudiation at will.' 2
Although the district court opinion did not so state, its decision that
a sovereign may repudiate a contractual waiver was in conformity with
the British rule. In the leading British case, Duff Development Co.
v. Government of Kelantan,3 a contract between plaintiff and the
sovereign defendant provided for arbitration of any dispute arising
under the contract. Both parties further consented to judicial enforce-
ment of the arbitral award. A dispute later submitted to arbitration
resulted in an award in favor of the plaintiff. When the plaintiff
sought enforcement of the award, the sovereign pleaded its immunity
as a defense to the court's purported authority. The House of Lords
held that since there had been no submission to the court, the repudi-
ation of the agreement to submit, while a breach of the contract with
the plaintiff, nevertheless precluded the court from taking juris-
diction.'4
Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., Z81 N.Y. 362, 24 N.E.zd 81 (1939). The district
court in the instant case also cited Lynch v. United States, 292 U.s. 571 (1934), which
quoted with approval the above passage from the Mississippi case.
15 197 F. Supp. at 723.
"The district court held that the Louisiana judgment incorporating the waiver
was entitled to full faith and credit. Id. at 722. It might be argued, therefore, that
the waiver should be given greater effect than a simple contractural waiver. Indeed,
no case cited by the court nor any of the leading British cases involved a waiver in-
cluded in a court judgment.
" [1924] A.C. 797. For discussions of the case and the problems it raises, see
Cohn, Waiver of Immunity, 34 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 26o (1958); Schmitthoff, The
Claim of Sovereign Immunity in the Law of International Trade, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
452, 462 (1958) 5 Note, 36 HARv. L. REv. 623 (1923) 5 Note, 41 L.Q. REV. x (1925).
"The district court's holding finds strong support in Viscount Cave's statement in
the Duff case that "if therefore a sovereign having agreed to submit to jurisdiction
refuses to do so when the question arises, he indeed may be guilty of a breach of his
agreement but he does not thereby give actual jurisdiction to the court." [1924] A.C.
797, 8o9. See Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] x Q.B. 149.
For a more recent application of the British rule, see Kahan v. Pakistan Federation,
[1951] 2 K.B. 1003, in which the court held that in spite of a sovereign's contractual
agreement to submit to jurisdiction, dismissal was required since the sovereign had
made no submission directly to the court. It is significant to note that the judges
declined to adopt the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity that was urged by the
plaintiff. See footnote S infra and accompanying text.
See also, United States v. Republic of China, [295o] Q.W.N. 6, [195o] Int'l L. Rep.
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This rule, apart from considerations of its fairness, is consistent with
British acceptance of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity which
confers immunity upon a sovereign in its non-governmental as well as
governmental functions.15 However, the district court's adoption of the
British rule would seem inconsistent with the United States' recognition,
in the Tate Letter,1" of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
which seeks to prevent sovereigns from asserting governmental pre-
rogatives when dealing with private parties in nongovernmental activi-
ties. Indeed, the claimants in the Bahia De Nipe case argued that
the State Department's suggestion of immunity conflicted with its earlier
acceptance of the restrictive theory.17  It would seem, that unlike
the court's holding that a sovereign may repudiate a contractual waiver,
the State Department's suggestion that the Bahia De Nipe be free
from attachment is not inconsistent with the restrictive theory, since
that theory has not been extended to allow attachment of a sovereign's
property for purposes of execution."8
168, in which the Supreme Court of Queensland held that a sovereign's right to im-
munity is unhampered by any contractual waiver it may have made.
"
5 The case generally cited as establishing the British acceptance of the absolute
theory and the rejection of the restrictive theory is The Parlement Beige, 5 P.D. £97
(i88o). See Kahan v. Pakistan Federation, supra note 14.
" Letter of the Acting Legal Adviser of the State Department [Jack B. Tate] to the
U.S. Attorney General Concerning Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Governments, z6
DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (195±). The Tate Letter summarizes the restrictive theory:
"the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts
(jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis) ." One of
the primary policy considerations stated in the letter is that "the Department feels that
the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in com-
mercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business
with them to have their rights determined in the courts."
For a judicial discussion and application of the Tate Letter, see National City Bank
of New York v. Republic of China, 34-8 U.S. 356 (1955). The Supreme Court refused
to recognize the assertion of sovereign immunity as to a counterclaim based on the
sovereign's defaulted notes. The district court in the Bahia De Nipe case refused to
apply the doctrine of the National City Bank case that fair play must be taken into
account in the application of sovereign immunity. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 197 F.
Supp. at 7±3.
" In rejecting this contention, the district court stated that "no policy with respect
to international relations is so fixed that it cannot be varied in the wisdom of the
Executive." 197 F. Supp. at 724.
"8 The active role which the State Department took in urging that the contractual
waiver not be honored rather than just a general immunity from attachment would
seem to be inconsistent with the policy of the Tate Letter.
Originally, the State Department did not interpret the restrictive doctrine as allowing
the attachment of a sovereign's property even for the limited purpose of obtaining juris-
diction. New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp.
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The State Department, however, did not stop with a mere sug-
gestion of immunity from attachment in the instant case. The depart-
ment maintained and received the district court's approval of the
proposition that it is not bound by the Tate Letter and may change its
policy at will.'9 The language and tenor of the district court's holding,
added to the State Department's contentions, leave in serious doubt
whether the United States may now be said to follow the restrictive
or absolute theory of sovereign immunity.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court in a per curiam
opinion on the ground that Ex Parte Per 2 o makes a suggestion of im-
684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The State Department seems to have now changed this
policy and to allow attachment in order to obtain jurisdiction. Stephen v. Zivnostenska
Banka, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128, 134 (1961).
For arguments concerning the extension of the restrictive theory to allow attachment
and execution, see Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 4.7
AM. J. INT'L L. 93 (1953); Claudy, The Tate Letter and the National City Bank
Case: Implication, 1958 AM. Soc. OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS 8o; Delson, .4ppli-
cability of Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity to 4ctions to Perfect 4ttach-
ment, 1961 AM. Soc. OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS 1213 Drachsler, Some Observations
on the Current Status of the Tate Letter, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 790 (196o) 3 Reeves,
Comments, x961 AM. Soc. OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS 1303 Timberg, Sovereign
Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 1o9 (196i).
g "But it [the Tate Letter] is wholly and solely a guide to the State Department's
own policy, not the declaration of a rule of law or even of an unalterable policy
position5 and, in addition, it sets forth only some of the governing considerations and
does not purport to be all-inclusive or exclusive." Memorandum of the United States
in Opposition to the Application for a Stay, filed September ii, 196i, with the
Supreme Court. Quoted in J. Bus. L., Jan. 1962, p. 54.
0 V8 U.S. 578 (1942). In this case, the district court acquired jurisdiction by
attachment of a ship which allegedly belonged to the Republic of Peru. The Supreme
Court held that in view of the State Department suggestion of immunity the suit
must be dismissed. The Court specifically left open the point decided by the district
court in Bahia De Nipe when it said: "We have no occasion to decide whether the court
should surrender the vessel and dismiss the suit on certification of sovereign immunity
by the Secretary, made after the friendly sovereign has once unqualifiedly assented to a
judicial determination of the controversy." 38 U.S. at 59o.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren also cited the Peru case in denying petitions for a stay
in the instant case. In addition, the Chief Justice also cited Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (945), in which the Court honored a suggestion of immunity
as to a -vessel owned but not possesed by Mexico. The Court stated the effect to
be given a State Department suggestion as follows: "It is therefore not for the courts
to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an im-
munity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize." 324
U.S. 30, 35 (1945).
For a criticism of the courts' uncritical acceptance of State Department suggestions,
see Franck, The Courts, The State Department and National Policy: A Criterion for
Judicial Abdication, 44 MINN. L. REa. 1xo (196o).
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munity by the State Department binding on the court. Although not
referring to the district court's holding that a sovereign may repudiate
a valid waiver of immunity, the Court of Appeals did mention the
waiver possessed by the Mayan Lines, but only briefly commented that
in the absence of State Department action the effect to be given the
waiver would be "a suitable subject for inquiry."'21
The Fourth Circuit's holding can be supported on the policy of
allowing the executive department all possible control over foreign
affairs-a policy especially appealing in the politically-charged Bahia
De Nipe case. However, the broader holding of the district court that
a waiver may be repudiated even in the absence of a State Department
suggestion of immunity is seemingly without policy support. If the
district court is followed, any provisions in contracts between private
parties and a sovereign whereby the sovereign purports to waive its
immunity to suit or execution will no doubt be rendered valueless, 2
while the strict import of the Court of Appeals' opinion will be to
make such contracts useless only when the State Department suggests
immunity. The partial limitation of the effectiveness of waivers im-
posed by the Swedish State Railway case2 ' is supportable on the ground
of protecting the sovereign from indiscriminate execution. If a sover-
eign were subject to execution every time it consented to suit, its
governmental functions might seriously be interfered with by those
obtaining execution on consulates and other vital property. However,
the need for such protection ceases when, as in Bahia De Nipe, a
sovereign voluntarily executes a waiver of immunity. In such a case,
the sovereign can incorporate in the waiver any exemptions it deems
necessary or desirable. Thus, the district court's holding deprives pri-
vate parties of much-needed protection, only to grant the sovereign
unnecessary power.
"
1 Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 295 F.2d a4, 26 (4th Cir. 196i).
" Query also the effect on the waiver of sovereign immunity required by the Civil
Aeronautics Board when issuing permits to foreign air carriers 14 C.F.R. § 3 3 9 .z(b).2 Dexter & Carpenter v. Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.zd 705 (2d Cir. 1930) (a waiver
.of immunity from suit does not carry with it a waiver of immunity from execution).
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